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We respond to the commentary of Franklin, Wright, and Davies
(Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 102, 239-245 [2009]) by
returning to the simple contrast between nature and nurture. We
find no evidence from the toddler data that makes us revise our
ideas that color categories are learned and never innate.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
In their commentary, Franklin, Wright, and Davies (2009) raise a number of questions concerning
both the theoretical framework of our argument and the validity of our results (Goldstein, Davidoff, &
Roberson, 2009). We first respond to their commentary on the theoretical framing and then to the re-
sults and methodological issues that arise from them.
At the end of their commentary, Franklin, Wright, and Davies (2009) welcome that the debate on
color categories has moved away from a simple contrast between nature and nurture even though this
is exactly the framing of the argument presented in the introduction to their 2005 article (Franklin,
Pilling, & Davies, 2005). In this response, we argue that it is too soon to abandon debate about the sim-
ple contrast. Of course, we are pleased that it is now generally acknowledged that language plays a
substantial role in the establishment of even basic level color categorical perception (e.g., Gilbert,
Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006). However, their commentary still presents a ‘‘neonativist” position in that
it holds the primacy of inborn color categories.
Franklin et al. (2009) argue, based on the infant data in Franklin et al. (2008), that the right hemi-
sphere of the brain is imbued with innate color categorical properties but the left hemisphere learns
color categories and, most important, that the left hemisphere then holds the default categorical
system. In adults, when the dominant left hemisphere system is suppressed by a concurrent task that
prevents access to verbal codes, or when it cannot be reached in split-brain patients, no trace of
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categorical organization in the right hemisphere remains (Gilbert et al., 2006; Roberson & Davidoff,
2000; Winawer et al., 2007). However, although this much is agreed by researchers on both sides of
the theoretical debate, it is still difficult to understand why only the right hemisphere should show
the innate color categories found in Franklin et al. (2008). How could these categories come about
when the visual input from the retina is the same to both hemispheres? There is no physiological
evidence that there are cortical cells with these properties anywhere close to visual cortex, nor is there
any behavioral evidence that they persist once linguistic categories are learned.
The original infant work (Bornstein, Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976) was flawed because it did not use
psychologically equal interval steps between colors. When that group of researchers turned to mon-
keys (Sandell, Gross, & Bornstein, 1979), they correctly changed to Munsell stimuli but, still having in
mind wavelength differences, got the separations wrong. They made the cross-category comparisons
substantially easier than the within-category comparisons (this can be seen by inspection of their arti-
cle and was summarized in Goldstein, 2008). Later work with monkeys—which have the same retinal
cone system as humans—could find no evidence for color categories (Fagot, Goldstein, Davidoff, &
Pickering, 2006). The Surrey group’s initial infant research (Franklin & Davies, 2004) does not suffer
from any of the early faults with infant data and so must remain a substantial river for the nurture
camp to cross. Our own attempt to replicate that work produced no evidence for color categories,
but our 4-month-old participants found the task uninteresting and many became restless and untest-
able (Lupyan, 2006; Roberson & Hanley, in press).
There are better new techniques used with infants, such as visual search, but these too have their
problems. In testing infants, Franklin and colleagues (2008) used only three widely separated colors
(one green target, one blue target, and a background color that was just on the green side of the
boundary between green and blue) because those used for adults were too difficult for infants to dis-
criminate. Thus, no direct comparison with adults can be made because the adults in the study saw a
different set of colors. Furthermore, given the difficulties of carrying out eye-tracking studies with in-
fants, the data came from only 13 infants. Nor have any infants to date been tested for the presence of
other category boundaries (e.g., the category boundary between the Russian categories sinii and golo-
boy) that are not proposed to be part of any universal innate set. Therefore, it is premature to conclude
that all prelinguistic infants show the same pattern of categorization as (English-speaking) adults
across the full range of visible colors. Those authors’ conclusion also stands at odds with the findings
of Xu and Carey (2000), where 6-month-olds were found to be insensitive to much larger changes in
the color of stimuli. Nevertheless, the infant data present a most interesting challenge to researchers
in the field. Given the significance of the theoretical consequences of innate color categories, it is
hoped that more infant laboratories will pursue investigations of these issues.
In an attempt to reconcile the existence of universal innate categories in preverbal infants with cul-
turally and linguistically diverse sets of categories in older children and adults, Franklin and col-
leagues’ (2009) commentary proposes two ways—apart from the understanding of color terms—in
which a child’s experience might contribute to the production of color categories. However, neither
explanation can provide an adequate account of the currently available data. The first explanation
is that different color categories might arise through different visual diets, but these natural illumina-
tion variations are highly unlikely to be relevant. The primary rainforest environment of the Berinmo
(Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000) is markedly different from the desert savannah environment of
the Himba (Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2004), yet their categorizations are remarkably sim-
ilar, as noted by Regier and Kay (2004). If color environment was important for the development of
color categories, there would be more than the small boundary differences observed between these
two populations, however important those small differences are for perceptual and memory judg-
ments (Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005). U.K. speakers of English and Welsh also share
a similar visual environment, yet Welsh has no separate terms for blue and green.
Of course, the effect of visual environment might be indirect. Because most of the traditional cul-
tures that have few color terms are located close to the equator, categorical differences might arise
after damage to the retina caused by sunlight exposure, as argued by Lindsay and Brown (2002). How-
ever there is now evidence to the contrary (Hardy, Delahunt, Okajima, & Werner, 2005; Regier & Kay,
2004), and in any case, as noted by Laeng, Mathisen, and Johnsen (2007), ‘‘Observed differences in col-
or vision were subtle, and they occurred within the normal range of human performance.”
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The second possibility is that infants are able to make use of the statistical regularities of their envi-
ronment (Younger, 1990). Younger’s data came from 10-month-olds, although Quinn and colleagues
have shown similar effects for younger children (e.g., Quinn & Eimas, 1996). Interestingly, what might
at first have been thought to be an innate appreciation of animal categories was found to be due to the
use of statistical regularities in the differences between cat and dog pictures (French, Mareschal,
Mermillod, & Quinn, 2004). Clearly, the cognitive abilities of the 4-month-old human are more sophis-
ticated than had been thought previously. However, this could not be the case for color categories that
lack this kind of separable statistical regularity. Color forms a continuous perceptual domain that can
be divided in a remarkably variable number of ways (Kay, Berlin, Maffi, & Merrifield, 1997; MacLaury,
1987). Moreover, perceived color varies with changes in illumination to such an extent that the only
available ‘‘statistical regularity” is generally the verbal label that is applied to a particular range of col-
ors. Although a 1-year-old could make use of the regular association of a color word to a color sensa-
tion, it seems unlikely that a 4-month-old could do so.
For toddlers, who are the subject of the current article, one could point to many examples (e.g., Choi
& Bowerman, 1991; O’Hanlon and Roberson, 2006) where children are sensitive to the labeling regu-
larities of their native language before they are able to accurately use the correct labels themselves.
Thus, one could argue that all toddlers might have knowledge of color terms from such associations.
Also, given that in both our data and the reanalysis by Franklin and colleagues (2009) the number of
children who do not know color terms, even at 2 years of age, is very small, these factors could down-
play the value of toddler research to answer the nature–nurture issue for color categories.
Turning to the data themselves, despite wishing to downplay the value of the toddler research,
Franklin and colleagues (2009) still wish to show that eight of the children in their study showed cat-
egorical perception despite being unable to name focal colors. For clarity, the commentators should
have made clear that these eight children whose data were reanalyzed were English. They should also,
as we argued in our article (Goldstein, Davidoff, & Roberson, 2009), have given the breakdown by
boundary (e.g., four children who were tested on the blue–green boundary failed to name or compre-
hend both green and blue), and they should have given the within- and cross-category success rates
separately for each boundary. We note that the very large size of the associated standard deviations
may indicate that some children were at chance on both tasks. In our view, the data from children
at chance on both tasks should have been removed from the sample because it is unclear whether
those children understood the task. Our analyses excluded data from children whose performance
was at chance. Inclusion of those data in our sample would remove any hint of a cross-boundary
advantage for either the blue–green or blue–purple sets of stimuli and would make our contrasting
result much more striking.
More important toddler data come from the Himba, where it is easier to claim that toddlers who do
not know color terms should not show evidence for Western color categories. However, even for them,
one might argue that they could have implicit understanding of their own terms and that these could
suppress any innate mechanisms presumed to exist in the right hemisphere. If so, Himba toddlers
would not show color categorical perception for Western categories. That is what we found for blue
versus green, but new data supplied from an unpublished thesis (Wright, 2006) suggest that some
Himba children do perceive blue and green categorically. However, these new data are not convincing.
Wright (2006) reported results for a comparison of only two pairs of stimuli, and the only result to fall
outside the 95% confidence interval for either pair was that of English children for the cross-category
pairs. Clearly, the Himba children tested by Wright found the task to be too difficult, and we regard
this new evidence as less than weak support for innate categorization.
The unpublished data of Wright (2006) give no details as to where the data were collected. One
possible explanation for the difference between our findings and those of Wright might relate to a cir-
cumstance highlighted by Franklin, Pilling, and Davies (2005). They reported excluding the blue–green
boundary from testing because they had found that a number of Himba people used the borrowed
term grine (green). In our recent visits to the area, we have also noted that the use of this term has
become increasingly common, especially in villages where mobile schools operate. The toddlers in
some areas, although not eligible to attend school themselves, might have heard adults or older chil-
dren using the term if they were in a village with a mobile school. Indeed, we have found that to be a
problem in our own data collection in some villages where only very young children appeared to be
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uncontaminated by borrowed color terms. Therefore, we conducted a second field trip to more remote
locations where it was possible to find older toddlers who had no knowledge of borrowed color terms.
Our results do, however, concordwell with other research onHimba children by those authors using
a visual search task (Daoutis, Franklin, Riddett, Clifford, & Davies, 2006). In those experiments, they
found a significant category effect for English children that increased with set size (see Fig. 1), but they
found no such effect for Himba children. They concluded, ‘‘Children can be aided by the category status
of stimuli when performing visual search: when the target and distractors belong in different colour
categories, search is more efficient. Moreover, this categorical advantage disappears if the target and
distractors are not separated by a linguistic boundary” (p. 397). These results directly contradict the
findings of Wright (2006). We note that here, as in Wright’s data and Franklin et al., 2005 data, the per-
formance of English children is faster and more accurate than that of Himba children of the same age.
However, because this was a visual search task, the difference cannot be due to Himba children’s lack of
training on memory tasks. It seems more likely that performance differences in all cases are due to the
increased task difficulty that accompanies the lack of separate verbal codes for targets and distracters.
In conclusion, we agree with Franklin and colleagues (2009) that toddlers may be influenced by the
linguistic categorizations of their native community before they accurately apply the appropriate cat-
egory labels; this has already been demonstrated in other modalities. Thus, we also agree that these
populations are not the best ones to test for the existence of an innate set of color categories. We dis-
agree, however, that the currently available evidence is sufficient to allow us to conclude that all hu-
mans have an innate set of color categories resembling that of (English-speaking) adults, especially
given that even English-speaking adults, under verbal suppression, show no evidence of retaining such
a set. We believe that debate on these issues should not be abandoned. Rather, we welcome a broad-
ening of the debate and note that new techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), are making a valuable contribution to issues such as the early involvement of language pro-
cessing in perceptual decisions about color (Tan et al., 2008). In the meantime, our data in the target
article (Goldstein et al., 2009) place important constraints on the previous conclusions about the pres-
ence of robust color categories before color terms are learned.
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